This book
by a German-Dutch team was written as part of a research project
on technology assessment funded by the Bureau of Technology
Assessment of the German Parliament. After a brief editorial
on 'Peace and Environment in the Transition to the 21st century",
and an executive summary in German, the book is divided in
three parts and seven chapters. The appendix includes an extensive
bibliography, an English summary and information on the two
institutions and on the authors.
Part I
develops the twofold theoretical context of 'preventive arms
control' and 'military technology impact assessment'. In chapter
1 (pp. 41-70) Hans Günter Brauch reviews the conceptual
context for the evolution of the arms control concept from
the classical competitive framework of the Cold War towards
the co-operative and preventive arms control after the end
of the East-West conflict. In chapter 2 (pp. 71-90) that was
drafted by John Grin, revised by Henk van de Graaf and translated
by Hans Günter Brauch the new concept of a 'military
technology impact assessment' was introduced as a tool for
preventive arms control.
Part II
provides three empirical case studies on the United States,
Germany and the Netherlands that deal with military expenditures
and institutions, procedures, and instruments on the weapons
innovation process and on arms control as well as for the
evaluation of military technology and military R&D programmes.
In chapter 3 (pp. 97-192) Hans Günter Brauch offers a
detailed analysis based on a systematic review of literature
and many off the record interviews with decision makers and
analysts in Washington on military expenditures, the weapons
innovation process, arms control organisations as well as
institutions, procedures and instruments of military technology
assessment in the United States of America. In chapter 4 (pp.
123-222) John Grin and Wim Smit with the research assistance
by Tom van Oosterhout provide a detailed analysis of the weapons
innovation and procurement process in the Netherlands, while
in chapter 5 (pp. 223-322) Hans Günter Brauch analyses
the same issues for the Federal Republic of Germany.
Part III
contains in two chapters a summary of the empirical and conceptual
results and concrete proposals. Chapter 6 (pp. 325-334) was
written jointly by Hans Günter Brauch and John Grin in
which the institutions, instruments and procedures for arms
control and military technology impact assessment are compared
and evaluated. Finally, in chapter 7 Hans Günter Brauch
offers 50 concrete proposals for implementing the concept
of preventive arms control into the weapons innovation process
in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Part IV
provides three empirical case studies on the United States,
Germany and the Netherlands that deal with military expenditures
and institutions, procedures, and instruments on the weapons
innovation process and on arms control as well as for the
evaluation of military technology and military R&D programmes.
In chapter 3 (pp. 97-192) Hans Günter Brauch offers a
detailed analysis based on a systematic review of literature
and many off the record interviews with decision makers and
analysts in Washington on military expenditures, the weapons
innovation process, arms control organisations as well as
institutions, procedures and instruments of military technology
assessment in the United States of America. In chapter 4 (pp.
123-222) John Grin and Wim Smit with the research assistance
by Tom van Oosterhout provide a detailed analysis of the weapons
innovation and procurement process in the Netherlands, while
in chapter 5 (pp. 223-322) Hans Günter Brauch analyses
the same issues for the Federal Republic of Germany.
English
Summary
1. This
study has four aims: first, the new concept of preventive
arms control will be developed; second, existing institutions,
instruments and procedures will be described for the United
States, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany
with respect to the linkage between weapons innovation and
civil research in areas that are sensitive for three arms
control regimes (NPT, BWC, CWC); third, it will be argued
whether and how military technology assessment could be introduced
as an instrument of preventive arms control in the parliamentary
system of the Federal Republic of Germany; and fourth, it
will be discussed which international initiatives the Federal
Republic of Germany should undertake with respect to preventive
arms control in OSCE, NATO, WEU, the EU and the United Nations.
2. This
study is organised in three parts: I. theoretical context
(chapters 1 and 2); II. three empirical case studies on institutions,
procedures and instruments regarding the weapons innovation
process and arms control in the United States of America (chap.
3), the Netherlands (chap. 4) and the Federal Republic of
Germany (chap. 5) and III. conclusions (chap. 6) and recommendations
(chap. 7).
3. With
the exception of preliminary conceptual proposals, at present
neither in the political practice of the OSCE states nor in
the transatlantic arms control discussions there exists any
elaborated concept for the development of a preventive arms
control policy. Chapter 1 attempts to contribute to such an
effort. The present arms control behaviour of governments
is dominated by the implementation of existing arms control
treaties. At present, the area of weapons innovation is neither
a topic of an operative arms control policy and of conceptual
planning in the U.S., the Netherlands and the FRG, nor is
the limitation of conventional arms exports. Both areas of
compensation for declining defence procurement budgets have
been a desideratum partly in research but primarily of existing
policies.
Preventive
arms control as the domestic component of an international
cooperative arms control policy is to aim at political stability
and crisis avoidance in the context of a co-operative and
collective approach. This requires a rather intensive prior
evaluation of all military research and technology concepts
as well as of the civilian research procedures that are affected
by existing arms control regimes based on these criteria:
- compatibility
with existing arms control treaties and with the declared
aims of the German Federal Government in ongoing arms control
negotiations;
- compatibility
with humanitarian considerations that its soldiers are not
protected against special health risks;
- compatibility
with the norms of humanitarian international law (e.g. with
the two additional protocols to the Geneva Convention of
12 August 1949, relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts, and with the Convention on
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional
weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious
or to have indiscriminate effects of 1981);
- compatibility
with international codes of conduct;
- cost
reductions by an early cancellation of public funding for
military and civilian research and development projects
that may have adverse arms control consequences.
This requires
an integration of procedures of self-control into the weapons
innovation process, the results of which must be accessible
for a detailed evaluation by the German Foreign Office, the
Bundestag and its budget review by the German Federal Accounting
Office. These procedures are to confront the policy-makers
at an early stage with the few critical cases that should
become an object of a military technology assessment which
could thus become an instrument assisting in the decision-making
process within Parliament.
Therefore,
preventive arms control in the military sector has to address
the institutions, instruments and procedures of the weapons
innovation process and in the civilian sector the public funding
in those gray areas that are sensitive with respect to arms
control obligations and goals. However, a major precondition
for such an integration of these conceptual ideas on preventive
arms control is a review of the tight classification procedures
that were enforced during the Cold War and a higher degree
of transparency towards parliament, its citizens and the general
public.
4. Technology
assessment is generally understood as an effort to evaluate
the social and political implications of technological developments.
Technology assessment was developed as a reaction to technological
determinism and the dangers of a technocracy. Initially, TA
was a purely academic activity that primarily focused on the
monitoring of consequences or of effects of technology for
the society aiming at critical assessments, early warning
systems and "counter-intelligence" in the struggle
against the technocracy. TA was based on the concepts and
justifications of the neopositivist, rational-synoptic school
in the area of policy analysis. Early TA-experts assumed that
their critical results would be directly reflected in public
decisions due to their scientific prestige. In this respect
TA itself was a technocratic concept in Habermas' interpretation.
In the 1970s, this school was replaced by a new approach that
stressed applicable knowledge and that initially involved
the clients and somewhat later other actors interested in
technology in order to offer the problem definitions for TA
and the inputs for the analysis. The following changes with
respect to TA-approaches can be noted: originally there was
an author-centred TA-type; somewhat later the client becomes
more actively involved in the process of implementing a TA;
and more recently several fora were created that involved
the representatives of interest groups and most recently interactive
TA approaches evolved.
These
changes with respect to TA approaches may be interpreted as
a first step towards influencing the process of technology
assessment itself instead of influencing the use of new technologies
and of technical systems. By supporting the interaction among
scientists, producers, clients, consumers and other representatives
of interest groups, interactive technology assessment aims
at the development of technologies and of technical artefacts
and not how technologies and artefacts are to be developed.
If an
expert in military technology assessment is invited to undertake
an evaluation of a military technology then the MTA-expert
acts in his capacity as a political adviser. In this respect,
the MTA-expert could assume three roles of: a) a policy adviser
as an analyst, b) a policy adviser as a policy advocate and
c) a policy adviser as a counsellor.
5. In
the United States of America, the end of the East-West conflict
resulted in a significant decrease in military expenditures
while spending on military research and development in relationship
with procurement has significantly increased. As a reflection
of its global hegemonial role numerous institutions participate
in U.S. arms control decision-making while Congress in its
own decision-making can rely on the advice of four support
agencies: a) the General Accounting Office (GAO), b) the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), c) the Congressional Research Service,
and d) the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) which was
closed down in October 1995. We reviewed the experience with
two procedures at the point of contact between weapons innovation
and arms control: a) with the Arms Control Impact Statements
(ACIS) and b) with the internal arms control implementation
as part of the work of the division of acquisitions in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. We recognised as a major
deficit that both procedures were unrelated to the routines
of the weapons acquisition process (milestone process). While
the instrument of military technology assessment has been
developed in the United States by OTA, nevertheless, due to
the lack of interest in the U.S. Congress, so far MTA was
used as a tool of a preventive arms control policy.
6. While
the U.S. annually spends about 500 times as much on military
research and development as the Netherlands, nevertheless
this NATO country has succeeded since 1984 - partly in reaction
to the critical discussions in the 1980s - to implement an
arms control assessment of new research and development as
well as procurement projects as an integral part of its Defence
Materiel Process. Furthermore several studies by INSTEAD (the
Interdisciplinary Network on Studies on Technology Assessment
in Defence in the Netherlands) on behalf of NOTA, the Dutch
version of OTA (e.g. on the ATBM capability of the Patriot
air defence missile) came pretty close to the goal of a MTA
as an instrument of preventive arms control. However, due
to the decreasing interest in the Dutch parliament these first
attempts remained without any major political impact.
7. At
present, the Federal Republic of Germany spends about one
fortieth of the U.S. expenditure for military R&D. However,
since German unification, a similar trend can be observed
as the one for the U.S.: the relative portion of military
R&D expenditure compared with procurement spending has
increased significantly. Inaddition, civilian research spending
in those gray areas affected by the Nonproliferation Treaty,
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention must also be taken into account. In the German
Ministry of Defence no reference could be found that new military
R&D and procurement projects are presently being reviewed
with respect to their arms control implications as an integral
component of the Phased Armaments Programming System. In comparison
with the United States, no formalised process of arms control
impact analysis of technology development and weapons procurement
as an integral part of required procedures for the implementation
of arms control treaties exists. At present, an arms control
evaluation of civilian research projects in areas that are
sensitive to existing arms control regimes (e.g. the decision
of the Federal Scientific Council (Wissenschaftsrat) on the
planned research reactor FRM-II in Garching relying on highly
enriched uranium) only takes place in reaction to specific
requests from Parliament. However, it is no constituent element
of a required internal interdepartmental review process. Both
in the executive and in the legislative branches of government
no interministerial or inter-committee procedures exist with
respect to the arms control compatibility of new military
and non-military research projects that are sensitive to arms
control obligations. Presently, in the Federal Republic of
Germany no scientific analyses exist on military (defence)
technology assessment as an instrument of a preventive arms
control policy concept. Furthermore, the independent scientific
capability for conducting such an undertaking is rather limited.
8. In
all three countries that were reviewed for this study at present
no procedures exist that require an arms control impact analysis,
comparable with the environmental impact statements, as an
integral part of the phased weapons innovation and procurement
processes, i.e. so far arms control considerations hardly
play a major role in the weapons innovation process. In the
United States, the arms control impact statements that were
required by law from 1976 to 1993 were primarily an instrument
used by the U.S. Congress to obtain information during the
budget process. This law required that the defence and the
energy departments had to make sensitive information on new
weapons developments available to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency which forwarded this information with an
interdepartmentally cleared analysis to the U.S. Congress.
However,
this instrument was completely detached from the phased milestone
process and it did not have any direct repercussions on the
weapons innovation and procurement process. So far, only the
U.S. and the Netherlands acquired a limited experience with
the instrument of military technology assessment, while in
the Federal Republic of Germany, this TAB-project on control
criteria on armaments can be seen as a first pre-stage that
may lead to MTAs in potential follow-on projects. From this
we conclude that evaluations from an arms control perspective
should become a part of the formal decision making process.
If the Members of Parliament are confronted with separate
evaluations of the military, industrial and arms control aspects
of a specific weapon or technology it remains unclear how
these different aspects will be balanced. There are several
solutions to this problem. According to a first solution the
responsible Parliamentary body bases its decision on a range
of different perspectives. It may even be better if several
actors with different perspectives could present their views
in a Parliamentary hearing. However, in order to avoid conflicts
of interest, MTA analyses should only be carried out by authors
and institutions that are completely detached from the Defence
Ministry but who will be given full access to classified material.
The authors of MTA-analyses, acting as counsellors, produce
such analyses as part of an analytic process in which several
policy perspectives are represented in order to do justice
to the different perspectives. Even if the participants in
such a process do not reach a final consensus, such an interactive
MTA-process in which representatives of industry, technology
experts, arms control specialists and military officers take
part would nevertheless be helpful, especially if controversial
aspects would lead to divergent political decisions.
9. The
fifty detailed proposals of this study are aimed at integrating
the concept of preventive arms control within the executive
as guiding principles on the one hand into existing procedures
of the weapons innovation process in the Ministry of Defence
and on the other hand into the distribution of research funding
by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology
and other funding agencies, such as the German Research Society
(DFG) or the Federal Scientific Council (Wissenschaftsrat).
The proposed Arms Control Compatibility Assessments (ACCA)
should then be evaluated by the disarmament division of the
Foreign Office. However, the evaluation of projects in the
area of nuclear physics, biology, genetic engineering, chemistry
and pharmacology requires a competence that is usually not
available in any foreign service. This competence could be
acquired either by rotating scientists from research institutes
and universities to the desk in the Foreign Office that would
be responsible for these evaluations either for a few years,
on an ad-hoc basis, or by contracting this task to a few highly
qualified scientists. These Arms Control Evaluations (ACE)
of the Foreign Office along with the Arms Control Compatibility
Assessments of the Defence and Technology Ministries should
then be forwarded to the Foreign Relations Committee as part
of the annual disarmament report by February each year. This
report should then be reviewed by an independent Arms Control
Advisory Panel of the Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms
Control. In controversial cases the Subcommittee should request
a military technology assessment through the Committee on
Education, Science, Research and Technology and Technology
Assessment. The resulting MTA should be reviewed a year later
by all sharetakers as part of an interactive MTA during a
Parliamentary hearing.
10. Three
groups of political initiatives for a preventive arms control
policy in the international realm are being recommended in
this study:
- Arms
Control Compatibility Assessments - as well as the right
of access of the Federal Accounting Office - should become
a component of all Memoranda of Understanding pertaining
to international military research, development and procurement
projects.
- The
integration of the concept of preventive arms control into
the existing foreign, arms control and military consultative
processes in NATO, the WEU, the CFSP and in the OSCE should
be considered.
- Furthermore,
policy initiatives should be developed with the goal to
introduce considerations of a preventive arms control concept
as a confidence building measure into existing international
reporting mechanisms (e.g. BWC) and to create additional
reporting requirements where they are presently missing
(e.g. NPT-regime, CWC).
In Art.
2 of the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany,
both German states prior to unification have stressed "that
only peace will emanate from German soil". Based on Germany's
historical obligation, the Federal Republic of Germany should
document its new responsibility by thinking ahead conceptually
in the area of confidence building, arms control and disarmament
as well as conflict avoidance and peace-building. One step
in this direction could be the development of a concept of
preventive arms control and the establishment of institutions,
procedures and instruments both in the national and in the
international realm for its realisation and implementation.
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